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I. Context and importance
When we think of Europe’s security role in East Asia, non-traditional 
security is what comes to mind. For example, promoting human and 
environmental security is both feasible and fits comfortably in the 
European Union’s (EU) security strategy. Monitoring cross-border 
pandemic outbreaks, working on climate change issues, collaborating 
on cyber-security, and containing weapons proliferation risks in 
coordination with East Asian partners are certainly important aspects 
that contribute to maintaining regional and global security. However, a 
closer look at the geopolitical dynamics of the Korean peninsula allows 
us to imagine a European contribution that transcends mainstream 
thinking.
On the one hand, the strategic partnership between the EU and the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) is a pillar of stability. Europe and the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) have solid institutional and operational bases for 
cooperation: 1) a Framework Agreement1 with political dialogue on vital 
topics like nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, human rights, climate 
change, energy security, and development assistance; 2) an FTA that is 
the EU’s first with an Asian country and the first in a new generation of 
EU trade agreements. Operationally, a bright spot has been the formal 
and ad hoc collaboration between EUNAVFOR and the ROK Navy in the 
highly successful counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden area. Beyond 
EU-ROK relations, strictly speaking, France, Germany, the UK and Poland 
all have solid economic and political ties to the ROK, while Sweden plays 
a unique role in monitoring the DMZ as a member of the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission.
On the other hand, Europe, and especially the EU, has been at best a 
minor player vis-à-vis the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 
a country that is a source of instability in East Asia and beyond. Current 
concerns include the DPRK’s human rights abuses and ongoing nuclear 
weapons programme, while world leaders and analysts fear the security 
risks represented by a potential disorderly regime collapse and the 
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consequent sudden movement to reunite the two Koreas. The security 
problems entailed are grave both regionally and globally: Nuclear, 
Biological, Chemical and Radiological (NBCR) weapons proliferation, 
cross-border organised crime and humanitarian and migration crises, 
just to name a few.
Because of Europe’s heretofore muted interests in Northeast Asian 
security and marginalization from such crucial dialogues as the Six-
Party Talks, Europe is not well positioned to react to such a scenario. 
Indeed the major players would obviously be the two Koreas, the 
United States (US) and China. That said, Europe should not be sidelined. 
Rather, the EU and select Member States can and should leverage 
the strength of the current Europe-ROK partnership in order to play 
a marginal, yet valuable role in contributing to Korean peninsular 
security, both now and in the case of sudden, chaotic DPRK collapse.
II. Policy overview and recommendations
The following sketches a few scenarios that could potentially elicit 
cooperation between Europe (especially the EU), the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) and other allies in the Northeast Asia region. The 
suggestions are predicated on the development of requisite political 
will in Europe, both on the EU and Member State level. The more 
attainable items require less will, the more difficult items more will. 
The analysis of Europe-ROK security cooperation identifies threats 
a) that both the EU/member states and the ROK perceive as in their 
common interest to fight (and in which the ROK and its allies might 
desire Europe as a partner), and b) that the EU/Member States can 
distinguish as fitting into their strategic security framework. In this 
regard, the roots of CFSP/CSDP are instructive: filling the ‘security 
gap’ in terms of the provision of both traditional and human security. 
Filling the security gap refers in the first instance to CFSP/CSDP 
objectives focused on global/regional public security provision that 
goes beyond the state/national security complex, which in the 21st 
century has difficulties in accounting for sources of insecurity such 
as predatory states and state failure, cross-border organised crime, 
terrorism, poverty, environmental and epidemic public health risk, 
and NBCR proliferation. It must be remembered, however, that human 
security qua a security gap to be provisioned is complementary—not 
antagonistic—to European security in the more general, traditional 
sense. All of this is clear from the 2003 ESS and the 2008 ESS 
Implementation Report, which explicitly describe fighting identified 
threats such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, state failure, and 
organised crime not only as good for those who immediately benefit, 
but also crucial for EU citizen security as well.
Secondly, filling the security gap through CFSP/CSDP means 
complementing European Member State capabilities (and arguably 
those of the US and other hard-security providing allies) and adding 
value to what other countries can do in their areas. It also refers 
to action within a multilateral, international mandate, i.e. actions 
taken in collaboration with partners who seek institutionalised 
coordination to respond to global/regional security concerns that 
might go unaddressed in an environment of free-riding.
Areas of Europe-ROK Cooperation
1) Northeast Asia’s Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)—
comprised of the ROK, Japan, and China—is a natural, regional 
multilateral partner for the EU’s European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDPC). The TCS holds periodic tripartite 
meetings of both health and agriculture ministers to coordinate 
measures for preventing, monitoring, and responding to infectious 
disease outbreaks. This approach mirrors that of the ECDPC, 
whose task of managing trans-boundary pandemics and vector-
born communicable diseases (especially from plants and animals) 
fits within the ESS Implementation Report remit on the security-
development nexus. In a world of ever increasing cross-border, 
inter-regional flows of people, health security concerns such as 
pandemic influenza, recurrent endemic polio reservoirs, SARS, 
antibiotic resistant tuberculosis, and coronavirus-caused Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome can best be countered through international 
best practice and data sharing, coordinated monitoring, and the 
establishment of early warning systems. The ECDPC and TCS working 
together closely in these areas would entail high human security 
benefits with low financial costs and political risk (to the contrary, 
in fact, such collaboration could lead to spillover into other areas of 
multilateral cooperation).
2) Dealing with global environmental challenges is another domain 
of ongoing and future cooperation between Europe and the ROK. 
Beyond climate change issues addressed via the EU-ROK FTA, there 
is one innovative area for EU-ROK environmental cooperation that 
would have immediate practical consequences and potential political 
spillover—accordingly this area is not low hanging fruit, but rather 
would require considerable political will both from Europe and 
the ROK. Namely, the DPRK will enter the carbon credit trading 
mechanism during the middle of this decade, as a total of thirteen 
emission certificate granting projects come online, including a 
major new hydroelectric plant. The ROK will host a carbon market 
beginning in 2015 (it will be linked to the EU carbon market, one 
should note). One of the recurrent ideas is that the ROK should buy 
DPRK carbon credits. This would not only join the ROK and DPRK in a 
global initiative to control GHG emissions, but, because it would be 
win-win economically for the two countries, it would allow for trust-
building that could serve to resuscitate better overall relations on the 
peninsula. There has even been high-level talk that the two Koreas 
could use a percentage of the transaction from the carbon trading 
scheme to set up an escrowed ‘unification fund.’
The problem is that currently—for political/diplomatic, legal, and 
logistical/technical reasons—it is difficult for the ROK to purchase 
DPRK credits. The EU—with its already developed carbon market and 
relatively clean hands on the peninsula—could serve as broker. This 
idea has in fact already been broached by the Hanns Seidel Stiftung 
in Seoul, which works closely with European partners in capacity 
building projects in the DPRK.
3) One situation of concern is various legal aspects that would 
complicate the transition toward reunification. For example, how 
would disputed property ownership claims in today’s DPRK be 
handled after the collapse of the regime? Many ROK citizens consider 
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themselves the rightful owners of property today owned de jure by 
the DPRK (an effect of property seizure or forced abandonment during 
the Korean War) and de facto by the North Koreans who occupy it. 
Following the collapse of the DPRK, those ROK citizens will make 
claims on their property. One option is to grant the claims, in which 
case many North Koreans will be both homeless and disgruntled with 
re-unification – a recipe for insurgency.
Another option is to give the North Koreans title to disputed 
property they currently occupy (while compensating South Korean 
claimants). In this situation it is likely that many North Koreans 
would sell their property for a quick windfall profit, which will 1) 
result in rapid inflation erasing the windfall; and, 2) leave those same 
North Koreans property-less in the long-term. Establishing systems 
that handle the claims, pay South Korean claimants and find a way 
to keep North Koreans occupying their property during a vesting 
period will be a huge challenge for a peninsula whose governance 
will be strained to breaking point by other collapse and re-unification 
tasks. Germany has some experience in this area, and its leaders and 
policy experts (either in government or via Track II dialogue) could 
assist the ROK both now and in the future to plan for and execute 
such administrative duties. Perhaps a type of EULEX judicial training 
mission could also be envisioned for such a scenario.
4) In a disorderly collapse situation, Korean authorities would face 
other possible legal challenges to whose solutions Europe could 
conceivably contribute. For instance, the ROK constitution recognises 
all Koreans – North and South – as Korean citizens, which means that 
during a transition situation presumed criminals would be entitled 
to due process. Many would benefit from a blanket amnesty; some 
would need to be tried. In any event tens of thousands would have to 
be detained awaiting justice. Not doing so would risk the formation 
of criminal organisations – traffickers, hacking rings, etc. – who could 
represent a security risk on the peninsula and beyond. Europe’s 
international law expertise and history of advising governments 
on transitional justice would be valuable to a Korea undergoing re-
unification. A more pointed question is that of who would guard these 
thousands of detainees awaiting trial or amnesty. At the very least, 
thousands of North and South Koreans would need to be recruited 
and trained to act as guards – a task that the ROK and the US would 
find difficult given the likely hard security concerns present during 
a disorderly transition. Even more likely is that a re-unified Korea 
would lack the manpower to carry out this guard activity itself, given 
the peninsula’s aging, declining population. Although reaching the 
necessary political will seems difficult, this is an area where the EU 
potentially could contribute to Korean peninsular security.
5) NBCR proliferation is one of the major concerns of a chaotic DPRK 
break-up, and accordingly there will be a race by concerned polities – 
the US, the ROK and China – to reach and secure weapons sites. One 
problem in such circumstances – especially for nuclear weapons – is 
that the non-proliferation treaty demands handling of weaponised/
weaponisable nuclear material only by recognised nuclear weapons 
states, a group to which the ROK does not belong. This would 
place the entire burden on US forces, who in this situation would 
already be stretched extremely thin. Most estimates maintain that 
to secure just the Yongbyon complex the US would need at least two 
Brigade Combat Teams (each with thousands of troops) specialised 
in securing such sites, to say nothing of the more than 200 other 
known DPRK weapons sites. The US, however, only has one team 
deployed permanently in the ROK, and in a rapid transition situation 
would have difficulty supplying sufficient BCTs. France and the United 
Kingdom (UK) both have such teams, and while the US alone would 
be responsible for reaching the sites initially, it would behoove all 
concerned to begin planning for contingencies in which the securing 
of said sites could be passed on to European allies so that US troops 
could be engaged in other necessary areas.
Once NBCR sites are secured, weapons disposal would remain a 
critical challenge. The DPRK has a large, diffuse chemical/biological 
weapons arsenal that would need to be destroyed following the 
collapse of the DPRK. The problem, again, is manpower. The ROK 
forces, even with significant US reinforcement, would in the best 
of circumstances be challenged by the demands of stabilising the 
peninsula. However, due to demographic decline the ROK military will 
drop from 22 to 12 active divisions by 2022 (528,000 current troops 
reduced to 415,000). As a recent RAND report argues, this force is 
nowhere near enough to stabilise the peninsula, and as a result the 
US will be called on even more than under current scenarios (Bennett, 
2013). In this situation, the critical task of securing and destroying 
the chemical/biological weapons stockpiles should fall to other 
international actors. As it happens, several European states have 
companies that possess field-deployable hydrolysis systems that can 
neutralise and destroy the weaponised chemicals/agents and their 
precursors. Airbus and Veolia are just two examples. Both companies 
even tendered contracts for carrying out this task on Syria’s chemical 
weapons stockpiles. Syria also serves as a precedent insofar as 
Danish and Norwegian ships helped transport the chemical weapons 
to their destruction destination in the Mediterranean Sea, while Italy 
volunteered but did not actually contribute. All this is simply to say 
that there is precedent for Europe acting in this domain, and following 
a disorderly collapse of the DPRK the US would be so preoccupied 
with geostrategic and hard security issues on the peninsula that it 
would likely welcome this type of European contribution to a crucial 
nonproliferation objective.
6) The possibility of a European hard security contribution to a post-
DPRK collapse seems preposterous. That said, the US Department of 
Defense currently has 28,500 troops stationed in the ROK and another 
50,000 in neighbouring Japan. Even in the current environment this 
number is too small to appropriately supplement the ROK military 
in the aftermath of a regime collapse in the DPRK; this situation 
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will deteriorate as the looming ROK troop cuts take place over the 
coming decade. Thus there will be an opportunity – a need, in fact – 
for international peace-makers/peace-keepers, and the EU could be 
at the top of the list. One might argue that this need is unlikely – that 
the US will add enough reinforcements – but it is not obvious that 
the US would want to do so. More to the point, events like regime 
collapse can happen very quickly, and the US may require more time 
than available to mobilise its forces. In such a situation, a stopgap EU 
force could be valuable.
Conclusion
Three additional points serve by way of conclusion. First, each of the 
areas of actual or potential Europe-ROK cooperation fits the remit of 
the European Security Strategy and its 2008 Implementation report. 
Moreover, they are largely complementary to hard security efforts, 
or, if they involve hard security provision, are complementary to the 
headline capacities of Europe’s allies, especially the ROK and the US. 
Second, some of the proposed fields of cooperation are incompatible. 
The soft security tasks (environmental) can be engaged in under 
basically any circumstances, but some of the hard security related 
items may preclude other types of actions because of political 
conflicts or scarce resources on both the European and ROK sides. 
For example, acting as a DPRK-ROK broker for carbon trading will 
likely not be possible if the EU is planning the contingencies of 
intervention in the DPRK following its possible collapse. Thus the EU 
and Member States will need to balance desirability and ambition and 
feasibility of action.
Third, the ongoing events in Ukraine and Iraq demonstrate that the 
US cannot simply pivot to the Asia-Pacific. It will need to continue 
to put serious military resources in other strategically vital regions. 
Moreover the US’s weak response to Russian involvement in Ukraine 
(and, earlier, Georgia) has unnerved US allies in East Asia—especially 
Japan and the ROK. Both of these points militate for the US’s allies—
including Europe—to be more involved in filling the (real or perceived) 
security gap.
Strategic thinking allows for pro-active contingency planning; 
even better, thinking about the future can allow actors to mould 
it indirectly in the present so that contingency plans may not even 
need to be used at all. There is no guarantee that the above possible 
courses of action are good ones, but they are worth evaluating and 
planning in consultation with ROK leadership and the US.
Endnotes
1This has been filled out with a Crisis Management Agreement 
signed by President Park Geun Hye and High Representative 
Catherine Ashton in May 2014.
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